Group cooperation against an incumbent

Abstract : In this paper, I study the ability of group members to cooperate against an incumbent in a repeated rent-seeking game and where group members and the incumbent have di¤erent valuations of the prize. I …rst consider that group members use Nash Reversion Strategies (NRS) to support cooperative behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a Stationary Subgame Perfect (Nash) Equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size, or the heterogeneity in the valuation of the prize, increases. In turn, I show that full cooperation within the challenger group can also be sustained as a Weakly Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium (WRPE). Yet, an increase in group size makes it more di¢ cult to sustain within-group cooperation but an increase in the relative valuation of the prize by group members still facilitates group cooperation.
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https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02378829
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Soumis le : lundi 25 novembre 2019 - 14:07:46
Dernière modification le : mercredi 27 novembre 2019 - 01:22:05

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  • HAL Id : hal-02378829, version 1

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Guillaume Cheikbossian. Group cooperation against an incumbent. 2019. ⟨hal-02378829⟩

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