Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks

We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.

Mots clés

Domaines

Economies et finances

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MartimortPouyetRicci_AES_HAL.pdf (444.44 Ko)

Origine	Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Licence	Autorisation HAL

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https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02057380

Soumis le : mardi 5 mars 2019-11:49:50

Dernière modification le : samedi 24 janvier 2026-04:04:29

Archivage à long terme le : jeudi 6 juin 2019-15:18:21

Dates et versions

hal-02057380 , version 1 (05-03-2019)

Licence

Autorisation HAL

Identifiants

HAL Id : hal-02057380 , version 1
DOI : 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081

Citer

David Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet, Francesco Ricci. Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, 132, pp.81. ⟨10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081⟩. ⟨hal-02057380⟩