Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks

We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.

Mots clés

Non-Renewable Resource Management Delegated Management Optimal Contract Asymmetric Information

Domaines

Economies et finances

Fichier principal

MartimortPouyetRicci_AES_HAL.pdf (444.44 Ko)

Origine	Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Francesco Ricci : Connectez-vous pour contacter le contributeur

https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02057380

Soumis le : mardi 5 mars 2019-11:49:50

Dernière modification le : vendredi 12 juillet 2024-14:16:02

Archivage à long terme le : jeudi 6 juin 2019-15:18:21

Dates et versions

hal-02057380 , version 1 (05-03-2019)

Identifiants

HAL Id : hal-02057380 , version 1
DOI : 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081

Citer

David Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet, Francesco Ricci. Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, 132, pp.81. ⟨10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081⟩. ⟨hal-02057380⟩

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