Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks - Université de Montpellier
Article Dans Une Revue Annals of Economics and Statistics Année : 2018

Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks

Résumé

We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.
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Dates et versions

hal-02057380 , version 1 (05-03-2019)

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David Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet, Francesco Ricci. Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, 132, pp.81. ⟨10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081⟩. ⟨hal-02057380⟩
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