A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover

Abstract : We consider an autocracy where the ruling elite control both the resource wealth and ed- ucation policies. Education prompts economic growth and enriches the budget of the elite. However, education also increases the “awareness of citizens”–capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor market aspirations –and forces the elite to ex- pand redistribution or handover the power. A power handover leads to a more democratic regime, where the elite retains (at least partially) its economic power. This trade-offis the backbone of our Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover. This theory provides new insights on the positive relationship between economic development, education, and de- mocratization, and on the negative relationship between inequality and democratization. Finally, we revisit the resources-curse hypothesis within our setting
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Soumis le : mardi 19 novembre 2019 - 14:42:52
Dernière modification le : vendredi 22 novembre 2019 - 09:54:27

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Raouf Boucekkine, Paolo Piacquadio, Fabien Prieur. A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, In press, ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.010⟩. ⟨hal-02370531⟩

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