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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Année : 2019

A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover

Résumé

We consider an autocracy where the ruling elite control both the resource wealth and ed- ucation policies. Education prompts economic growth and enriches the budget of the elite. However, education also increases the “awareness of citizens”–capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor market aspirations –and forces the elite to ex- pand redistribution or handover the power. A power handover leads to a more democratic regime, where the elite retains (at least partially) its economic power. This trade-offis the backbone of our Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover. This theory provides new insights on the positive relationship between economic development, education, and de- mocratization, and on the negative relationship between inequality and democratization. Finally, we revisit the resources-curse hypothesis within our setting
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Dates et versions

hal-02370531 , version 1 (30-04-2020)

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Raouf Boucekkine, Paolo Piacquadio, Fabien Prieur. A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019, 168, pp.269-291. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.010⟩. ⟨hal-02370531⟩
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