This research studies the impact of various coopetition strategies (horizontal and vertical coopetition) on product commercial performance. Considering the mixed results of the existing literature on coopetition and performance, we shed new light on their contributions by making a distinction between horizontal and vertical coopetition thanks to a change in our level of analysis from the firm to the product level. Building on the coopetition and the bargaining power literatures, we elaborate a theoretical model and several hypotheses. Using a database in the real estate brokerage industry, we show that horizontal coopetition strategies increase the product commercial performance whereas vertical coopetition strategies don’t. In addition, we underline that horizontal coopetition is more beneficial to large firms than to small firms. Finally, we put forward the existence of a learning effect regarding coopetition strategies. In other words, the more firms coopete over time the better they get at extracting value at their own advantage. These results not only contribute to the literature focusing on the performance implications of coopetition strategies but also to the coopetition theory by underlining the bargaining power mechanisms at stake in presence of coopetition.