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M. ,

, Beta

, Momentum

, Duality indicates that the CEO chairs the board. Founder indicates that the CEO is the founder of the firm. Tenure is the CEO's number of years in post. Board size is the number of directors or members of the supervisory board. Board ind. (for independence) is the proportion of independent directors according to the AFEP-MEDEF code. Board type indicates that the firm functions with a management board and a supervisory board. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. M/B (for Market/Book) is stock market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Debt is total debt over total assets. Beta is calculated using daily returns over the previous year. Dispersion (for Forecast dispersion) is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts by financial analysts. Momentum is the firm's stock return over the previous year, Ties (for CEO-Board ties) is the proportion of directors sharing a common degree with the CEO. X (for Polytechnique