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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2019

A new rationale for not picking low hanging fruits: The separation of ownership and control

Résumé

Recent attempts at explaining the energy-efficiency gap rely on considerations related to organizational and behavioral/cognitive failures. In this paper, we build on the strategic delegation literature to advance a complementary explanation. It is shown that strategic market interaction may encourage business owners to instill a bias against energy efficiency in managerial compensation contracts. Since managers respond to financial incentives, their decisions will reflect this bias, resulting in lack of investment.
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hal-02316599 , version 1 (15-10-2019)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02316599 , version 1

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Denis Claude, Mabel Tidball. A new rationale for not picking low hanging fruits: The separation of ownership and control. 2019. ⟨hal-02316599⟩
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