A new rationale for not picking low hanging fruits: The separation of ownership and control

Abstract : Recent attempts at explaining the energy-efficiency gap rely on considerations related to organizational and behavioral/cognitive failures. In this paper, we build on the strategic delegation literature to advance a complementary explanation. It is shown that strategic market interaction may encourage business owners to instill a bias against energy efficiency in managerial compensation contracts. Since managers respond to financial incentives, their decisions will reflect this bias, resulting in lack of investment.
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https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02316599
Contributeur : Laurent Garnier <>
Soumis le : mardi 15 octobre 2019 - 14:23:20
Dernière modification le : jeudi 17 octobre 2019 - 01:15:45

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WP 2019-21.pdf
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Distributed under a Creative Commons Paternité - Pas de modifications 4.0 International License

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  • HAL Id : hal-02316599, version 1

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Denis Claude, Mabel Tidball. A new rationale for not picking low hanging fruits: The separation of ownership and control. 2019. ⟨hal-02316599⟩

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