Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Goal-oriented agents in a market

Abstract : We consider a market where \standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goalorented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payo (the \trigger") to ful ll a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments..
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [36 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Laurent Garnier <>
Submitted on : Friday, July 17, 2020 - 10:33:16 AM
Last modification on : Monday, November 16, 2020 - 4:26:04 PM


WP 2020-12.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : hal-02901398, version 1


Ines Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolas Quérou. Goal-oriented agents in a market. 2020. ⟨hal-02901398⟩



Record views


Files downloads